Vadinar CPS – boat lying idle for nine months	**Somnath CPS – boat lying idle for 10 months**

सत्यमेव जयते

Report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India on General and Social Sector for the year ended March 2012

Government of Gujarat

Report No. 4 of the year 2013

CHAPTER - II

PERFORMANCE AUDITS

This chapter contains three performance audits on 'Inner Layer Security of the coast of Gujarat State', 'Management of Bio-Medical Waste in Government-sector hospitals' and 'Implementation of Integrated Child Development Services'.

HOME DEPARTMENT AND AGRICULTURE & CO-OPERATION (FISHERIES) DEPARTMENT

2.1 Inner Layer Security of the Coast of Gujarat State

Executive summary

The Government of India (GOI), Ministry of Home Affairs approved (January 2005) Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) which envisaged strengthening the infrastructure for patrolling and surveillance of coastal areas to check and counter illegal cross border activities. Accordingly, State Government prepared (May 2005) five years' Perspective Plan under the CSS for establishing 10 Coastal Police Stations (CPS), 25 Coastal Check Posts (CCP) and 46 Coastal Out Posts (COP), up-gradation of police stations, setting up of watch towers, camel patrolling and augmentation of Sagar Rakshak Dal. During performance audit covering six districts comprising eight CPSs, the following was noticed.

- *The Government of India approved (January 2006) the Perspective Plan for setting up of 10 CPSs, 25 CCPs and 46 COPs, providing 30 boats, vehicles and furniture/equipments. The State Government had not taken any action to implement the remaining components from State funds.*
- *The locations of four CPSs were changed for geographical and administrative convenience. Also, the locations identified for some CCPs/ COPs were found water-logged and hence CCPs/ COPs were constructed deep inside the mainland at six places of Ahmedabad and Banaskantha districts.*
- *The Construction of five out of 10 Coastal Police Stations was delayed for periods ranging 73 to 535 days. The work of 23 CCPs and 29 COPs executed with pre-cast concrete slabs was of inferior quality.*
- *In selected districts, out of 50 CCPs/COPs completed, 36 (72 per cent) remained non-operational as police personnel were not deployed.*
- *In the absence of demand from State Government to GOI, dedicated jetties were not constructed to maintain secrecy. The marine exclusive intelligence and investigation wing at each CPS as envisaged in the Standard Operation Procedure was not established. Shortfall in sea*

patrolling ranged between 78 per cent and 91 per cent; night patrolling was zero to 34 per cent. Boat repair facility was at a distant place and delay in repairing of patrolling boats ranged from four to 13 months.

- *No effective steps were taken by Agriculture and Co-operation (Fisheries) Department for preventing Indian fishermen crossing International Maritime Boundary Line. The Boat Movement Token System to keep watch on fishermen/vessels was found to be ineffective. Satellite based vessels tracking and warning device system sanctioned at a cost of ₹ 46.16 crore (May 2008) to caution fishermen before approaching international boundary was not established.*

- *Shortage of manpower was 35 per cent and 46 per cent in policing staff and crew members respectively. Out of the trained staff, 69 per cent was deployed for other duties. The monitoring mechanism envisaged in the CSS was not established.*

2.1.1 Introduction

Gujarat has 1,640 kms long coast line spread over 13 districts. Due to its sea route proximity with Pakistan, it holds very high strategic importance from the perspective of internal security of the country. Coastal security arrangements consist of three tiers, of which 0-12 nautical miles (NM) are protected by Coastal Police of the States, whereas beyond 12 NM to the high-seas, the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy are responsible for protection.

With a view to strengthening the capabilities of State Police Forces for securing the coast from illegal cross border and criminal activities using sea and coast, a Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) was formulated (January 2005) by Government of India (GOI) for implementation by the State Governments. GOI directed (February 2005) the State Governments to prepare five years Perspective Plan for CSS Phase-I. The entire Plan aimed to set up 10 Coastal Police Stations (CPS), 25 Coastal Check Posts (CCP) and 46 Coastal Out Posts (COP), besides providing interceptor boats, vehicles and equipments to each CPS for effective surveillance of coastal areas.

Audit findings

Planning

2.1.6 Perspective Plan for coastal security

The long term Perspective Plan provides strategies and work plan for deploying resources and setting performance indicators for successful implementation of scheme/programme. The State Government prepared (May 2005) five years Perspective Plan for CSS (Phase-I) for the security of the coastal areas which included –

- Establishment of 10 new CPSs with necessary infrastructure;
- Equipping each CPS with two 12 tonne boats and one 5 tonne boat with communication equipments and weaponry for sea patrolling in the defined area;
- Setting up of 25 Coastal Check Posts (CCP) to check the movement of vehicles/persons in coastal area and 46 Coastal Out Posts (COP) for effectively policing the entire coastal area;
- Up-gradation of 39 existing Police Stations;
- Setting up of 90 watch towers at strategic locations to ensure round the clock surveillance on the seashore;

- Patrolling on 53 camels where motorable roads adjacent to coast do not exist or vehicle patrol is not possible due to difficult landscape; and
- Increase the strength of *Sagar Rakshak Dal* from 4,000 to 12,000 to keep watch on the suspicious movements along the coast and to assist the police in patrolling.

The Government of India approved (January 2006) the Perspective Plan for an outlay of ₹ 58.43 crore for setting up of 10 CPSs, 25 CCPs and 46 COPs, providing 30 boats, vehicles and furniture/equipments,

2.1.7 Deficient planning

Locations of CPSs were changed for geographical situation and administrative reason

The Perspective Plan envisaged establishing CPSs/CCPs/COPs at the strategic places identified after detailed survey. The details of location of CPSs proposed/ established is shown in the **Map-1** below –

Map-1: Ten Coastal Police Stations established in the State



Source: Information provided by Additional Director General of Police

2 Up-gradation of police stations, setting up of watch towers, camel patrolling and augmentation of Sagar Rakshak Dal

Only one Coastal Police Station was established in the sensitive Kachchh district with coast line of 238 kms

As could be seen from the map that locations of four CPSs[3] were changed. Scrutiny of the implementation of the Perspective Plan approved by the GOI revealed the following –

- Jamnagar and Kachchh districts are at utmost proximity with maritime border of Pakistan and hence sensitive for coastal security. However, to cover entire coast line of 238 kms of Kachchh district only one CPS (Mundra) was established (July 2007). Audit observed that later on, two boats were diverted (one boat each from Hazira and Pipavav CPS) and stationed at Jakhau (Kachchh district) for patrolling, which was inadequate to cover long coastal line.

Sensitive coast line between Dwarka and Harshad left without coastal patrolling

- Similarly in Jamnagar district, due to change of location of two CPSs (Bhatia to Vadinar and Harshad to Okha), the entire coast line stretch between Dwarka and Harshad was left without any coastal patrolling. On the other hand, all three CPSs of Jamnagar districts were established in one stretch between Bedi and Okha.

The reasons attributed by concerned SPs for changing locations were geographical situation and administrative convenience. Thus, geographical situation and administrative convenience were given primacy rather than security perception.

The Government stated (September 2012) that in view of the flexibility given in the High Level Empowered Committee (HLEC) meeting (November 2005) to State Government, it was decided to change the locations. The reply of the Government is not justified as the Perspective Plan was required to have been prepared after proper survey and analysis of threat perception.

During Exit Conference, Government explained that original locations were changed as the same were away from coast-line and facility of jetty also not available. The contention of the Government is not acceptable as long stretch without police presence could adversely affect coastal security.

2.1.10.4 Construction of CCPs/COPs at non-coastal area

The DGP directed (October 2005) SPs to initiate proceeding for acquisition of land for CCP/COP and keep in touch with GSPHCL for taking up construction work at the earliest. However, work of three CCPs[8] and four COPs[9] were not taken up as land acquired by the SPs were in low lying areas and were submerged in water during high tide and flood.

Land allotted for Rayon Naka CCP was low lying and hence not suitable

Land allotted for Ozal Machhivad COP was not suitable as area submerged in monsoon

While executing of the work, the contractor completed pre-casting work of panels and erected them at six places (Ahmedabad City and Banaskantha district) other than the CCP/COP sites, while one structure for Rayon Naka CCP remained un-erected. Thus, an expenditure of ₹48.23 lakh incurred on these panels could not be utilised for the purpose of coastal security.

The GSPHCL stated (June 2012) that SPs concerned did not arrange for suitable land to be provided for CCPs/COPs. Thus, no alternate suitable land was provided by SPs and GSPHCL also awarded the work without considering suitability of site.

The Government stated (September 2012) that identified places were found unsuitable for construction due to water logging problem therefore, the locations were changed. The reply of the Government was not acceptable as the land was acquired without considering its suitability. Further, utilisation of pre-cast panels at Ahmedabad city and Banaskantha district, being far away from coastal line, would not add any value to the coastal security.

2.1.11 Non-operating of CCPs/COPs

36 CCPs/COPs remained non-operational

The CCPs and COPs were established for effective policing of the entire coastal area by checking the movement of vehicles/persons in coastal area. It was observed in selected districts that out of 21 CCPs and 29 COPs completed, all the CCPs and 15 COPs remained non-operational (March 2012) due to shortage of staff.

8 (i) Veraval Rayon, (ii) Devka and (iii) Ghantia Tran Rasta (Junagadh district)

9 (i) Aasharmata, (ii) Dholupir in Kachchh district, (iii) Ozal Machhivad in Navsari district and (iv) Kosamba in Valsad district

In 14 COPs, two to three personnel of the rank of Assistant Sub Inspectors/Head Constables/Constables (29 *per cent* to 43 *per cent*) only were posted against the overall sanction of seven posts and hence operated with skeleton manpower.

Further, as per Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), CCPs/COPs were to be equipped with furniture, communication (telephone and wireless) equipments, computer, investigation kits and arms. Field visits (10 COPs) and information collected (four COPs) revealed that except seven COPs, where furniture was provided, no item as per SOP was provided in any of the 14 COPs.



Non-operational Jakhar CCP (Jamnagar district)



Non-operational Umarsadi COP (Valsad district)

SPs of the concerned districts attributed (February-May 2012) reasons for non-operation of CCPs/COPs to shortage of staff. Thus, operation of the CSS did not make any practical difference so far as cross-border security threat perception was concerned.

The Government stated (September 2012) that all CCPs and COPs were functioning and maximum possible police personnel were posted therein. The reply of the Government was not correct as during audit test check a few COPs were found functioning that too with internal re-deployment of staff.

2.1.12 Non-creation of Jetties

Dedicated jetties for CPSs as provided in Standard Operating Procedure have not been constructed

The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) envisaged construction of all-weather jetty for each CPS with adequate draft and should be constructed away from jetties used by fishermen to maintain secrecy of police operations. High Level Empowered Committee (HLEC) (November 2005) decided to allot additional funds for construction of jetties on submission of estimates and demands to Ministry of Home Affairs by the concerned State. However, no demand was sent by the State and no jetty was constructed for any of 10 CPS in the State (March 2012). In the absence of dedicated jetties for Police operations, CPSs utilised the jetties owned and controlled by the GMB or private (captive/ commercial) entities.

Bedi CPS - Jetty owned by GMB; area remained dry during low tide

Bhavnagar Port CPS – Jetty owned by GMB; patrolling possible as and when log-gate opened during high tide



Nava Bandar CPS – Private captive Jetty owned by Ambuja Cement Company Private Limited–not convenient for small boats. Hence boats were kept alongside of dredger

Navi Bandar CPS –Jetty owned by GMB at Porbandar; facility being shared with Indian Coast Guard and local fishermen, causing problem due to congested area

Joint field visit of test checked CPSs revealed that jetties used were not appropriate for smooth and secure operations.

- At Bedi Port and Bhavnagar Port patrolling was possible only during high tide as Ports remained dry during low tide;
- Jetties at Somnath and Porbandar CPSs were very congested as same were also used for fishing operation by the local fishermen;
- CPS Nava Bandar and Mundra were utilising private jetties which were located at a distance of 41 kms and 14 kms respectively from the CPS;
- GMB jetty at Okha was very badly damaged and was not repaired.

The Government stated (September 2012) that there was no sanction for jetties in Phase-I of the Scheme and that jetties of GMB were used, which were quite safe and secure as they were under the operational control of GMB and capable of maintaining confidentiality.

The Government also stated that SOP provided for one jetty for each CPS, whereas only five jetties were sanctioned in Phase-II in the State; that the expert opinion estimated expenditure of around ₹2.50 crore per jetty, but only ₹50 lakh were sanctioned. The reply added that police boats were receiving priority at Somnath and Porbandar jetties. It was also stated that Nava Bandar and Mundra CPSs were utilising nearest jetties and repairs of the GMB Okha jetty was to be carried out by the GMB.

The reply of the Government was not justified as the SOP provided for independent jetty for each CPS and utilisation of private jetties or damaged jetties would result in compromising police requirements.

Operational activities

2.1.13 Non formation of Marine exclusive Intelligence and Investigation wing

In absence of instruction from Government, Marine exclusive intelligence and investigation wing was not formed in any district

The SOP provides that each CPS should establish an exclusive intelligence wing for collection of actionable intelligence and inputs on weak areas on coastal security. The Investigation Wing responsible for collection of information about suspicious activities, movements of suspects, their places of residence/visit, communication modality, sources of finance, etc. was to be formed. However, no such intelligence and investigation wing was formed in test checked CPSs. The SPs replied (February-May 2012) that no instruction was received from Government for forming intelligence and investigation wings.

The Government stated (September 2012) that new Intelligence Centres were opened in the coastal area, where State IB in coordination with Central agencies was gathering actionable information and providing to Coastal Police.

The reply of the Government is not acceptable as the SOP provides for establishing exclusive intelligence with each CPS, which has not been done so far.

2.1.14 Patrolling

Coastal patrolling is an essential activity for effective prevention of infiltration and unlawful activities like smuggling of arms, ammunition, explosives, drugs etc. For many years, the trawlers hired by the State Police for patrolling had proved ineffective as hired trawlers did not match the speed boats used by the criminals.

For effective patrolling along the sea coast, the GOI allotted (between May 2009; January 2012), 30 interceptor boats (two 12 tonne boats and one 5 tonne boat for each CPSs) to the State.

The efficiency and effectiveness of boats for coastal patrolling as noticed in test checked CPSs is discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

2.1.14.1 Under-utilisation of patrolling boats

Out of three boats allotted to each CPS, one boat only was utilised

The Government of India instructed (September 2009) that each boat should be used for patrolling for a minimum 120 hours in a month with a yearly tasking of minimum 1,400 hours which was revised (October 2010) to 150 hours and 1,800 hours respectively. The deficient tasking in a month was to be carried forward to the subsequent months to achieve the yearly tasking.

However, in test checked CPSs, due to non-availability of staff only one boat out of three was operated for daily patrolling. Therefore, there was shortfall in patrolling ranging between 78 *per cent* and 91 *per cent* **(Appendix-VII)** in eight selected CPSs.

Police Sub Inspectors (PSI) of CPSs attributed (February-May 2012) reasons for the shortfall to shortage of crew members. The Government stated (September 2012) that patrolling of four hours each in morning and evening was being carried out as per instructions of Ministry of Home Affairs, trained crew have been deployed and recruitment of more crew members was in process.

The reply of the Government is at variance with the replies furnished by the concerned PSIs with regard to quantum of patrolling and availability of crew.

2.1.14.2 Inadequacies in night patrolling

In absence of instructions night patrolling was negligible

The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) provides for night patrolling depending upon fishing activities. Night vision binoculars were also provided to each boat for the purpose. However, no specific criteria for night patrolling were fixed by the State Government. As a result, night patrolling to total patrolling hours remained negligible **(Appendix-VII)**. Audit observed that –

- No night patrolling was conducted by Bhavnagar Port and Vadinar CPSs;
- Night patrolling done by Nava Bandar, Mundra, Okha, Navi Bandar, Bedi and Somnath CPSs were three, four, five, 11, 24 and 34 *per cent* respectively against the total patrolling hours.

The Government stated (September 2012) that SOP for coastal patrolling was followed scrupulously up to 8.00 pm. The reply of the Government was not acceptable as (i) night patrolling was required to have been continued depending upon fishing activities after 8 pm in the night and (ii) some CPSs had not carried out night patrolling and the remaining CPSs conducted negligible patrolling.

2.1.15 Checking of fishing boats and boarding operations

The SOP provides for checking of fishing boats during patrolling and boarding operation,[10] which would ensure prevention of infiltration by hostile forces, smuggling of arms/ammunitions, smuggling of contraband, etc. However, no specific guidelines were issued by State Government on selection of boats/ boarding operations and number of boats/boarding operations to be subjected to checking.

In absence of any guidelines, performance of CPSs varied. Number of boats checked and boarding operations carried out during 2009-12 by CPSs ranged from 337 to 2598 and from zero to 499 respectively. Not a single case of seizure/ arrest was reported by CPSs after checking/boarding operations.

Government stated (September 2012) that fishing boats were being checked regularly and that till date 18,742 boats had been checked during patrolling and seven offences registered.

Fisheries related security concerns

There were 102 marine fishing centers on Gujarat coast and about 22,000 fishing boats going to sea. As per last census (2007) conducted by Commissioner of Fisheries, there were over 1.40 lakh active fishermen in the State. As the State has the longest coastline (1640 km) in India and has international maritime boundary with Pakistan, it was necessary to keep a constant watch on the movement of the fishermen and their vessels.

To assist the security agencies like Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Police for ascertaining the identity of the fishing boat and its crew members, GOI/State Government introduced various schemes/projects as discussed in succeeding paragraphs. All activities relating to fishing/fishermen were under the charge of Commissioner of Fisheries under Agriculture and Co-operation Department.

2.1.17 Vessels tracking and warning system

Since the State shares International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) with Pakistan, there were instances of Indian and Pakistani fishermen crossing/ straying into the boundary of the other, which was a source of concern. Despite declaring the area of five NM along with IMBL as 'No Fishing Zone', lure of fish catch in the area tempted fishermen to enter the zone as well as to cross the IMBL.

Tracking and warning system for fishermen not established

The information with Commissioner of Fisheries (CF) showed that 612 Indian fishing boats and 430 Indian fishermen were in custody with Pakistan (June 2012). To caution Indian fishermen before they approach the international boundary, State Government decided (May 2008) to provide satellite based vessels tracking and warning device system to 12,000 fishing boats and ₹46.16 crore[11] was placed at the disposal of GMB for procurement of the system.

However, GMB had not even finalised the tenders for purchase of the system (June 2012). GMB stated (June 2012) that tenders for procurement of the system were invited (August 2007), but Tender Acceptance Committee of the Government rejected (August 2010) the tender as it was stated to be supported by fraudulent documents. However, no fresh attempt was made for procurement of the system. Thus, vessels tracking and warning system to the fisherman was yet to be installed and funds amounting to ₹46.16 crore were blocked for over two years.

During Exit Conference, Government accepted the audit observation and stated that they had initiated the procedure for taking the funds back from GMB and further utilisation in consultation with Indian Space Research Organisation for the system.

2.1.18 Issuance of token to fishing boats

Boat movements were registered on boarding and landing without physical verification

The State Government introduced (September 2009) a system of issuing 'Boat Movement Token' to each fishing vessel venturing into sea. The Fisheries Guard was to maintain log book for boat movement and fill in details like registration number and name of boat, name and identity card number of crew members, date of venturing into sea and expected date of return, etc. The fishing vessels along with crew members and their identity were to be checked on venturing and their return from sea to ensure that all fishermen who had gone for fishing had indeed returned.

Joint field visit of landing points of fishing boats by Audit and Fisheries-officials revealed that the details furnished by *tandel*/owner of fishing vessels at the time of venturing to/returning from sea were not being cross-checked physically by the Fisheries Guards. As such, purpose of watching the movement of fishing boats and its crew members on security grounds was defeated.